Election
Fourteen Chairs, One Unresolved Problem: The Case for Electoral Independence in Nigeria
November 16, 2025 · Peter Yohanna
As democratic governance stabilized, however, subsequent appointments pivoted from judicial and legal experience to emphasize academic and technocratic expertise.
In October 2025, President Bola Tinubu appointed Professor Joash Ojo Amupitan, SAN, as the new Chair of Nigeria’s Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Expectedly, the appointment has reignited debates about transparency, institutional independence, and executive control over Nigeria’s electoral administration.
The question over the INEC chair’s appointment stems from Nigeria’s constitutional design. Section 154 of the 1999 Constitution gives the president authority to nominate INEC’s Chair, subject to Senate confirmation. In practice, this confirmation has become largely procedural - no nominee has been rejected by the legislature - and it has raised the question of how someone can oversee a process fairly where their appointers are actively involved. Attempts have been made to correct this, ranging from requesting a shortlist from an independent body or removing the appointment process from the president entirely, but the present form remains and leaves the autonomy of the Commission and its chair in question.
From Judges to Academics: The Changing Profile of INEC Leadership
Since the creation of the Electoral Commission of Nigeria (ECN) in 1958, fourteen men have led the country’s electoral bodies, from the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) under military regimes to today’s Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Each phase reflected its governing context. Under military rule, appointments such as Chief Michael Ani (1976) were decreed directly by the head of state to legitimize transitions back to civilian government. By contrast, Justice Victor Ovie-Whiskey (1980–1983) served during the civilian Second Republic, overseeing elections under President Shehu Shagari’s administration. During the shift to the Fourth Republic in 1998, General Abdulsalami Abubakar appointed Ephraim Akpata to oversee the transition elections that restored democracy. Civilian administrations that followed continued the same pattern Olusegun Obasanjo appointed Abel Guobadia (2000 - 2005) and later Maurice Iwu (2005 - 2010); Goodluck Jonathan appointed Attahiru Jega (2010 - 2015), a move widely praised for signalling reform; and Muhammadu Buhari appointed Mahmood Yakubu (2015 - 2025), reappointing him in 2020 to consolidate technological innovations like BVAS and IReV.
The role requires a diverse range of technical and managerial expertise, ranging from overseeing different logistic preparations to constitutional adherence in interpreting the electoral law and appreciating the limitations of the Commission. It also involves actively and proactively managing Nigeria’s demands and needs for free, fair and credible elections with the almost impossible expectations of citizens. As such, in an era of increased public exposure and scrutiny, effectively serving as the face of a key democratic arm has also become a new role of the chair, which comes with the necessary expertise in deftly managing media engagement.
Appointments to Nigeria’s electoral management body have historically reflected the prevailing political context and the qualities deemed necessary to lend credibility to elections. Chairs overseeing transition elections such as Chief Michael Ani (1976) in 1979 and Justice Ephraim Akpata in 1999 (1998–2000) were senior jurists whose legal backgrounds symbolized integrity and the rule of law qualities crucial during transitions from military to civilian rule when legitimacy was fragile.
As democratic governance stabilized, however, subsequent appointments pivoted from judicial and legal experience to emphasize academic and technocratic expertise. All subsequent chairs in the Fourth Republic boasted academic expertise, although both Guobadia (physicist) and Iwu (pharmacognosist) did not highlight backgrounds that would necessarily be associated with an election administration chair. Jega (political science) and Yakubu (history) were more seasoned administrators, with the former serving as president of the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) and Yakubu helming the Tertiary Education Fund (TETFUND) under President Yar’Adua.
Jega in particular had been a member of the famed Uwais Committee on National Electoral Reform and was able to institutionalise several recommendations around data management, governance reforms and engaging civil society. Yakubu was also in a position to build on Jega’s achievements by introducing the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) and the INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV), both operationalising Uwais’s call for transparent result management.
However, both leaders operated within the constraints of presidential appointment and funding structures, leaving core Uwais recommendations such as an independent appointment body and secure tenure for electoral commissioners unrealised. Thus, while Jega and Yakubu advanced administrative and technological reforms, the broader institutional reforms required to safeguard INEC’s autonomy remain largely aspirational.
Amupitan’s appointment could be considered a synergy of previous legal expertise, with his background in law and his status as a Senior Advocate of Nigeria, and academic standing. Conversely, his lack of active experience in election administration could also imply the need to learn on the job, a situation that the country can ill afford. The pick, and the varied response, shows a dissonance between appointer and citizens over what an ideal INEC chair should reflect.
INEC's Structural Contradictions
Accordingly, as expectations are being set for a new chair, it is important to reflect on certain inherent guardrails that already check their ability to deliver. Effective oversight is complicated by the fact that state-level executives, namely the Resident Electoral Commissioners (RECs) and State Administrative Secretaries, are also appointed by the President and operate somewhat independently of the Chair’s day-to-day control. This means that a chair is limited to work with officers they cannot unilaterally sanction and who know their loyalty is primarily to the appointer and not necessarily to their line manager.
In April 2023, the Adamawa State REC, Hudu Yunusa‑Ari, unilaterally declared a winner of the governorship election in the middle of an incomplete result collation process. The national INEC headquarters declared his action null and void and directed him to stay away from the state office. Yet, as observers have pointed out, only the president, acting with a two-thirds majority from the Senate, can effect removal of a REC under the relevant legal provisions. This structural arrangement thus raises questions about the extent to which INEC’s Chair can exercise direct disciplinary sanctions, enforce uniform policy implementation, or guarantee accountability at the state level.
Appointments, and expectation management, also afford us the opportunity to look beyond personnel and perhaps the office itself. After all, catering to more elected voters than the rest of the West African region and dealing with elections from the presidency and national legislature seats to the governorship can be demanding and challenging for any institution. In response, some have called for a decentralization of such processes, especially to cater to different nuanced realities across different regions and to reduce the fixation on central power and appointments. This could free up the chair and the commission to focus on party oversight, checking campaign finance impropriety and catering to the many election-related litigations that arise.
The centralisation of Nigeria’s electoral management system has long been defended as a safeguard against regional bias and political interference, yet it increasingly raises questions about efficiency, responsiveness, and local legitimacy. Proponents argue that such centralisation ensures uniformity in standards and protects the process from capture by state governments, as seen during the First Republic when regional electoral bodies were manipulated for partisan ends. However, critics contend that Nigeria’s size and diversity demand a more decentralised approach that empowers local electoral structures to manage operations at ward or local government levels, particularly in voter education, logistics, and result collation. The increasing use of technology such as the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) and the INEC Result Viewing (IReV) portal already demonstrates that real-time uploading of results from polling units can make elections both transparent and locally accountable without requiring excessive central oversight. A reimagined model could retain INEC’s national regulatory and standard-setting role while devolving certain operational functions to state or zonal offices, thereby improving efficiency and deepening public trust. Ultimately, the question is whether Nigeria’s democratic consolidation is better served by a centralized bureaucracy that guarantees uniformity, or by a decentralised system that enhances proximity, participation, and institutional agility. Reflecting on such a question should definitely have formed part of the vetting and recruitment process.
Reforming Appointment, Rebuilding Trust
INEC makes a major emphasis of the ‘Independent’ in its name, but real independence requires more than integrity pledges; it requires institutional redesign. Reform must therefore begin with how INEC’s leadership is chosen. The presidency’s control over appointments should be balanced through a transparent, multi-stakeholder process that involves representatives from the judiciary, legislature, civil society, and professional associations. Candidates should undergo open vetting and public hearings, with civil society and citizens able to scrutinise the process and provide input.
The scrutiny and focus behind the appointment speaks to a broader question of voter disillusionment around democracy, especially if there is little faith in those overseeing the process. The consequence is cyclical: each new administration inherits both control over and scepticism toward the electoral body. This undermines long-term democratic consolidation. Low voter turnout hovering around 26.72% in the 2023 general elections, the lowest since 1999 illustrates the extent of voter apathy linked to this distrust. The perception that outcomes are pre-determined discourages participation and fuels post-election litigation, which, in turn, weakens the legitimacy of elected governments.
Beyond Amupitan’s appointment, electoral administration needs to reflect the growing concern about how elections in Africa’s largest democracy are won and lost. Only by embedding transparency, accountability, and shared responsibility in the system can public trust be rebuilt and future elections administered in a way that is widely accepted as fair and impartial.